UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-21-2008

Johnson v. McPhee Appellant's Brief Dckt. 33966

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Johnson v. McPhee Appellant's Brief Dckt. 33966" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1558.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1558

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

LAW CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)

Curtis "Jay" Johnson

)
)

I

I

) DOCKET #33966
Plaintiff/ Appellant,

vs.
MikeMcPhee
JCAV, LLC
Defendants / Respondents

)
)
)
)
)

. I
I

i

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

I

.I
Appeal from the District Court of the 1st Judicial District for Kootenai County. Honorable John
Patrick Luster, District Judge presiding.

I

• I

I

. I

Curtis Jay Johnson
Appellant, pro se
Residing at 1206 N. 6°' St. Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
CURTIS "JAY" JOHNSON,

)

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

V.

MIKE McPHEE and JCAV, LLC,
Defendants-Respondents.

ORDER AUGMENTING
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Supreme Court Docket No. 33966
Kootenai County Case No. 05-8999
Ref. No. 08S-026

A MOTION.TO AMEND THE APPELLATE BRIEF and MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
THE APPELLATE BRIEF (TREATED AS MOTION TO AUGMENT) with attachments were
filed by Appellant Curtis Jay Johnson on June 19, 2008.

Thereafter, an OBJECTION TO

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT was filed by
counsel for Respondent Mike McPhee on June 23, 2008.

Further, an OBJECTION TO

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT was filed by
counsel for Respondent JCAV, LLC on June 23, 2008. The Court is fully advised; therefore,
good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant Curtis Jay Johnson's MOTION TO AMEND
THE APPELLATE BRIEF be, and hereby is, DENIED.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant Curtis Jay Johnson's MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT THE APPELLATE BRIEF (TREATED AS A MOTION TO AUGMENT) be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and Appellant's Brief which was previously filed with this Court on
April 21, 2008, shall be augmented and shall include the item listed below, a copy of which
accompanied this Motion:
1. Appellant's J;ft;erences to the Record.

DATED this _1:l::__ day of July 2008.
By Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Curtis Jay Johnson, pro se
Counsel of Record

ORDER AUGMENTING APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Docket No. 33966

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Curtis "Jay" Johnson

vs.
MikeMcPhee
JCAV, LLC

)
)
)
) SUPREME COURT DOCKET #33966
Appellant,
)
)
)
)
Respondents )

APPELLANT'S REFERENCES TO THE RECORD
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State ofldaho in and for the County ofKootenai

HONORABLE JOHN PATRICK LUSTER
District Court Judge, Presiding

Curtis "Jay" Johnson
1206 N. 6 th St.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Pro Se Appellant

fanD. Smith
ISB#4696
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3019
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Attorney for Respondent
MikeMcPhee
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Stepehen B. McCrea
ISB #1654
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1501
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Attorney for Respondent,
JCAV,LLC

APPELLANT'S REFERENCES TO THE RECORD

Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
"McPhee deceived Johnson into believing he would be paid, that he could trust "us", meaning
JCAV." (Vol. l, p.180, page 83-86)
"The respondents deceived Johnson and everyone else by pretending they were partners."
(Vol. 1, p. 140-141, pg. 13-14, In. 4-25, 1-8) (Vol. 2, p.229-230)
"McPhee also deceived Johnson into believing he would be selling the lots ... "
(Vol I, p.147-148, pg. 40-42)
" ... desperate and in agony. He relied on JCAV's financial backing and McPhee's promises."
(Vol. 1, p.101, 2nd & 4 th paragraph)
CONINUINGTORT
" ... water torture abuse ... " "(JCAV Tr.2, P.94-95, Johnson)"
(Vol.1, p.182-183, pg 94-95)
"Once McPhee stopped making part payments and Johnson appealed to JCAV, McPhee's cruelty,
hatred, vulgarity and domination became torrential ... "
(Vol. 2, p.375) (Vol. I, p.186, page 108, In. 2-23) (Vol. I, p.194-195, pg 89, ln.13 - pg 94 ln.19)

EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS
''McPhee testified under oath that Johnson's allegations were a complete fabrication."
(Vol. I, p.91)
"Assuming that McPhee's conduct caused post traumatic stress disorder in Johnson ... "
(Vol. 2, p.393-396) (Vol. I, p.101, 4th paragraph)
" ... assuming McPhee' s conduct caused Johnson to faint and pass a massive bowel movement ... "
(Vol. 2, p.390, 3rd paragraph)
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" ... violent and shocking demonically evil repeated invasions of Johnson's mind ... "
(Vol 1, p.99, 2-3rd paragraph) (Vol. 1, p.183, pg. 95, In. 1-25)
" ... threatening to screw a woman Johnson loved and charming her away form him ... "
(Vol 1, p.99, 2nd paragraph)
JCAV Liability for McPhee's conduct

" ... hostile aggravation, tormenting, and undue influence ... within the scope ... "
(Vol. l, p.194-195, pg 88, ln.11-pg 94 ln.19)
"Johnson has testified that he informed JCAV of the wanton conduct ... "
(Vol. l, p. 102, 3rd paragraph) (Vol. 2, p.376-377)
" ... and JCAV admittedly did nothing."
(Vol. 2, p.365, Nr. 21, middle of page) (Vol. 2, p.367, Nr. 41, top of page)
Breach of Contract

"REAL ESTATE COMMISSION Guideline# 20"
(Vol. 2, p.354-356)
"Johnson alleged that McPhee refused to sign a contract, and used undue influence ... "
(Vol 1, p.171-172, pg. 50, ln.14- pg 53, In. 2)
"The oral contract to pay Johnson a real estate commission... "
(Vol 1, p.148, pg. 42, In. 7-9) (Vol 1, p.165, pg. 60, In. 2-3) (Vol. 1, p.102, 2nd paragraph)
... "is enforceable due to part payment ... "
(Vol. 1, p.102, 2nd paragraph) (Vol. 1, p.102, 3rd paragraph) (Vol. 2, p,376)
"The real estate commission had made a data entry error... "
(Vol 2, p.353, ln.3, in bold)
" ... to argue that McPhee was not an agent of JCAV is absurd;
... numerous real estate contracts; ... McPhee was authorized to send threatening letters; ...
McPhee was authorized to sign a listing"agreement on behalf of JCAV."
(Vol. 2, p.229-230) (Vol. 1, p.75, Nr. 6-7) (Vol. 2, p.331-343)
Negligence against JCA V

2

"INTERROGATORY NO. 41. .. INTERROGATORY NO 21"
(Vol. 2, p.365) (Vol. 2, p.367)

"Email to Jack Vanderwaal from Jay Johnson dated August 26, 2005):"
(Vol. 2, p.376-377)
"Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson, July 31, 2006: I appealed to Jack Vanderwaal"
(Vol. 1, p.102, 3rd paragraph)
"Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson regarding text messages, August 29,2006 #16)"
(Vol. 1, p. 130)
" ... the actual damages ... "
(Vol. 2, p.376-377) (Vol. 1, p.103)

Perjury
" ... perjury before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho ... "
(Vol. 2, p.229-230)
"Affidavit of Jack Vanderwaal, April 12, 2006:"
(Vol 1, p.26-27)
"Instead the Court repeatedly referred deferentially to their testimony in its ruling."
(Tr. p.65, Ln.13-14; p.61 Ln.23-24; p.69, Ln 6)
"Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson, July 31, 2006: I believe that McPhee had a power over
Jack ... " (Vol. 1, p.102, 4th paragraph)

Statement of the Facts
(Facts not covered in the Argument portion of Appellate Brief)
"The buyer needed a time extension."
(Vol 2, p.344)
"McPhee wanted the buyer gone, and wanted his $30,000 ... "
(Vol 2, p.347-348)
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"Johnson organized about 6-8 meetings ... , the final one with Jack Vanderwaal."
(Vol. I, p.141, pg.IS, ln.18 -pg.16, ln.8)
"Rumors spread he was a sex offender of many flavors."
(Vol. 2, p.391, 2nd paragraph)
" ... so he went to work on his own, designing state of the art real estate developments ... "
(Vol. 2, p.370) (Vol. I, p.102, 2nd paragraph)
"His landlord invested in him and kept him alive ... "
(Vol. 2, p.374, 2nd paragraph)
"JCAV had earned about $1 million dollars "overnight" on the commercial deal."
(Vol. 2, p.379, 2nd paragraph)
" ... McPhee denegrates Johnson and his work and says the part payments were a gift."
(Vol. 2, p.381, bottom of page)

DATED---lU"'-+-'//_'7-+-/_0__:_V_
r I
Appellant, Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of June, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing documents to be served by facsimile to the following:
STEPHEN MCCREA, ATTORNEY FOR JCAV, LLC
608 NORTHWEST BLVD
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814
FACSIMILE (208) 664-4370
IAN SMITH, ATTORNEY FOR MIKE MCPHEE
608 NORTHWEST BLVD
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814
FACSIMILE (208) 765-9089

Appellant, Pro Se
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Statement of the Case
This case for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress involves primarily
diabolical psycho-sexual mind torture and a resultant life threatening psychiatric condition in the
appellant. The torture occurred as the parties worked together on high stakes real estate deals,
and culminated in the respondents making part payment and then breaching an oral contract to
pay the appellant for his work as their agent on a project, which he'd done a year and a half
earlier. The respondents' breach and their conduct thereupon was wanton and negligent.

Course of the Proceedings
The case was decided as a matter of law on all causes of action for the respondents at summary
judgment, with prejudice. The Court ruled primarily that the torture was not extreme and
outrageous, that the claim was time barred, that there was no showing of an agency relationship
between the respondents, that the part payment exception to the statute of frauds did not apply to
the oral contract for commission due to an unspecified specific real estate statute.

Statement of the Facts
In this· case, appellant Curtis Jay Johnson, (hereinafter Johnson) was a real estate agent
who found a highly profitable commercial real estate deal (6600 Government Way) for his friend
and customer Mike McPhee (herinafter McPhee), which JCAV, LLC eventually purchased, half
of which Johnson then listed for sale and sold.

During the resale period, which lasted around 8 months (Jan. - Aug. 2003), McPhee told
Johnson out of the blue, suck my dick, and meant it. McPhee then went on to stare Johnson in
the eyes and lick his lips, slurp, etc., and then finally told Johnson, "Bend over, I'll drive," while
Johnson was driving a golf cart. This was freakish and violent torture and psychological
slaughter. Johnson evenh1ally became a psychiatric cripple, mostly due to psychosomatically
experiencing violent sodomization, which resulted in PTSD and massive bodily chaos.
The property appraisal value came in short of the sale price, so the buyer needed a time
extension. McPhee wanted the buyer gone, and wanted his $30,000 non-refundable earnest
money right now. McPhee went ballistic when Johnson told him it wasn't going to happen.
McPhee aggravated and tormented Johnson during the time the buyer used to get the extra cash.
McPhee didn't want to sell, but the sale eventually closed. Johnson was paid his commission by
JCA V according to the listing contract, which McPhee signed on behalf of JCA V.
JCAV was wholly owned by Jack Vanderwaal, who had a son Lane Vanderwaal, who
brought McPhee and Jack Vand~rwaal together. Lane Vanderwaal consistently encouraged
Johnson to close the sale, despite McPhee. Johnson assnmed and was led to believe that the
three were ownership partners, but they weren't. Those three formed Vanderwaal and
Associates, which, ainong other ventures, operated the commercial property.
McPhee had the idea to build a Jake subdivision during the time he was abusing Johnson
in 2003, so he asked Johnson to find him a spot on the prairie. For Johnson this was an
immaculate opportunity, especially since he was still a relatively novice agent. McPhee and
Johnson had been very close friends for over a year. Johnson felt inferior to McPhee, and
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endured McPhee 's abuse, mostly due to McPhee being his customer, but also due to his own
recently lowered self esteem.
Johnson had a love interest that lived on the same lake as McPhee in Washington.
McPhee charmed Johnson's girlfriend as he was torturing Johnson. He told Johnson he was
going to screw her, that he had "diameter". This became crucial to the severity of the
psychosomatic experience of sodomization, and the extremity of Johnson's injuries.
McPhee told Johnson that "we" will pay you, if the landowners don't, regarding property
for the man made Jake. Johnson worked almost a year on the deal, until he dropped out due to
psychiatric issues. By the time he left, Jack Vanderwaal had committed to financing the lake,
and the landowners (Neighborhoods, Inc. and George Thayer) had committed to selling.
Johnson organized about 6-8 meetings between McPhee, the landowners and the engineer, the
final one with Jack Vanderwaal. Johnson also had commitments from several builders to buy
I 0-50 lots a piece. McPhee promised Johnson many times that he would be selling the lots.
Johnson's mind was, however, extremely twisted around a phallic projectile lodged in his
guts. When he looked at people, they freaked out, thinking he was some kind of evil person.
Rumors spread he was a sex offender of many flavors. Johnson couldn't go anywhere, so he
went to work on his own, designing state of the art real estate developments, which were
awesome according to everyone. But Johnson was mentally ill and couldn't hide it, so no one
invested in his projects and he went broke, and got evicted.
Somehow Johnson happened into a home owned by his eventual benefactor who lives in
Sacramento. Johnson had begun a massive self help effort before, but now he made a discovery,
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called Look Your Heart in the Mirror, and had a reason to live and a divine calling. His landlord
invested in him and kept him alive and enabled him to finally sue. Today still, Johnson lives in
the home primarily by financial help from his landlord, but is in constant peril of homelessness.
Thanks to Johnson's work, JCAV had earned about $1 million dollars "overnight" on the
commercial deal. Thanks to Johnson's work, JCAV and McPhee had a deal with extremely
cooperative landowners for the lake project. Johnson fully believed that his well served
customers would reward him for his work, as they promised. But when it came time to signing
agreements, McPhee refused to do so, and told Johnson they'd pay him direct, not through a
broker.
Johnson was pathetically weak and mentally crippled at the time, and had been
thoroughly and viscously slandered and ostracized as a sex offender. He could barely get off his
back, let alone argue with McPhee, who had the power of death over Johnson, truly.
When JCAV bought the land for the lake, there was no money in the Joan for a real estate
commission. McPhee paid Johnson $2,000 twice as part payment of the commission, using the
Vanderwaal & Associates checking account. Johnson asked for more and McPhee refused, so
Johnson appealed to Jack Vanderwaal by phone and email, telling Jack Vanderwaal that McPhee
had reneged and been cruel and hostile. JCA V took it under advisement, then told Johnson, we
already paid you $4,000 and I've already invested so much personal money in the lake.
Johnson told JCA V by phone that McPhee had told him to perform oral sex, had tortured
him and left him desperate and broke. Johnson imitated the slurping noise McPhee had made.
JCAV was sick and seemed resolved to work things out. But then he talked to McPhee, who
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probably said, Johnson is crazy. In an email produced through discovery, written by McPhee to
JCAV at this time, McPhee denegrates Johnson and his work and says the part payments were a
gift.
Johnson was desperate and had to talk with McPhee again, if he wanted to get paid. He
was facing eviction and deranged, helpless, so lacking any other option he text messaged
McPhee, trying to rouse his conscience. But McPhee became hostile and abusive, which for
Johnson, given his condition, was almost fatal. Johnson texted JCAV, trying to impress upon
JCA V that McPhee was a liar and a fiend, that Johnson was near death, that Johnson had earned
the money, and that there would be a lawsuit ifhe wasn't paid. JCAV did nothing and did not
answer.
During the suit, JCA V disavowed agency with McPhee, although JCAV affirmed before
a notary that McPhee was a managing member of JCAV on a contract to purchase land for the
lake. JCAV ratified approximately 4 real estate contracts negotiated and signed by McPhee on
JCA V's behalf, with the appellant acting as the real estate agent. JCA V also authorized several
other official acts by McPhee on behalf of JCA V.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Intentional And Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Court ruled that the alleged sexually charged abuse and hostile aggravation occurring
in 2003 were barred by the statute oflimitations, that because the conduct primarily consisting
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the claim was separated by approximately two years time, the continuing tort theory did not
apply. Appellant argues that the continuing tort theory should apply.
The Court made no verbal ruling on appellant's argument that the defendants should be
equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense for the conduct occurring
in 2003. The appellant argues that equitable estoppel should apply.
The Court made no verbal ruling on appellant's argument that he was disabled and that
therefor the running time of the statute should be suspended. LC. 5-230 should apply.
The Court ruled that even if Johnson's allegations of sexually charged abuse were true, it
was "possible to infer" that McPhee's conduct was "inconsiderate or hurtful, but not
outrageous," and that the conduct did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous required for
a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court erred, since the summary
judgment standard in a Court trial is not whether an inference is possible, but rather most
probable. The Court further erred by weighing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
moving party in making this inference.
The Court ruled that the things that Mr. Johnson complains about are all attributable to
McPhee and certainly is not actionable against JCA V on that basis." The Court erred.
Breach

of Contract

The Court ruled that the contract had to be in writing, regardless of part payment, based on "a
specific real estate statute, and that statute requires a writing." That statute is apparently LC. 542084 and only addresses agency representation, which Johnson never asserted, nor did he need in
order to pursue his contract rights to compensation, which were formed upon part payment.
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Negligence

The Court ruled that it was not established from the record that there was an agency relationship
between Mike McPhee and JCAV, and even if the Court were willing to construe such an agency
relationship, there is certainly nothing to indicate that JCAV had approved of or acknowledged
any of the conduct that is attributable to McPhee. The court erred. There was agency, implied
and express authority, and by its acquiescence, JCA V ratified or approved the cond]Jct, by law.
Perjury

The respondents committed prima facie felony perjury before a Notary Public of the State of
Idaho, by affirming before the same notary on the same day that they were both managing
members of JCAV, LLC. In an affidavit, Jack Vanderwaal swore off any agency relationship
between himself and Mike McPhee, swore that Mike McPhee was not now nor was he ever a
member of JCA V, swore that he and Mike McPhee had no agreement to buy land for Radiant
Lake. This perjury and the agency it creates and the Court's indifference to it is evidence of
bias.
Bias

The Court stated that Mr. Vanderwaal's affidavit and certainly the record indicates that at the
time of the transaction involved that there was no agency relationship, and that there really is
nothing more than a mere scintilla of evidence of that fact. Affirming before a notary that Mike
McPhee is a managing member of JCAV, on a contract to purchase the land at the time of the
transaction is an admission to agency, in fact, and the Court's comments are incomprehensible,
considering there were also several contracts in the record negotiated and signed by McPhee on
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behalf of JCAV, and testimony from JCAV that McPhee was authorized to perform official
duties only an agent could perform for JCAV. Judge Luster was formerly a law partner with
Steve McCrae, who represents JCAV, coincidentally, and the entire ruling in this case is clearly
biased for the respondents.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
Intentional And Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Statue of Limitations/ Equitable Estoppel
The court made no verbal ruling on appellant's argument that the respondents should be
equitably stopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense for conduct occurring in
2003.

-Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 871 P.2d 846, 125 Idaho 429 (Idaho App. 1994)
Defendant may be equitably estopped from relying on statute oflimitations if his
statements or conduct caused plaintiff to refrain from prosecuting action during
limitations period.
-J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'! Inc., 126 Idaho 532, 887 P.2d 1039 0994)
The elements of equitable estoppel, the only non-statutory bar to a statute of limitation
defense in Idaho, are: (1) false representation or concealment ofa material fact with
actual or constructive knowledge of the truth. (2) that the party asserting estoppel did
not know or could not discover the truth. (3) that the false representation or
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon (4) that the person to
whom the representations were made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied
and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice.
-Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson, July 31, 2006: I lived in torment and dire poverty for
about one year, my only comfort came from the expectation of payment for my work on
Radiant Lake Estates.
(JCAV, Tr. 2, P.86, Ln. 6-10, Johnson)
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6. He said that when, I think when he paid me
7. the first $2,000.
8. Q. Okay. He said, Trust us?
9. Yeah, We always come through; we'll always
10. come through for you.
(JCAV, Tr. l P.13, Ln. 4-9, Johnson)
4. Q. Who are the principals of JCAV?
5. A. Jack V anderwaal, and apparently I thought
6. Mike McPhee was a principal, but apparently Jack
7. Vanderwaal was the only principal, and then Lane
8. Vanderwaal is a member, as far as I know, and so is
9. Mike McPhee.
(JCAV Tr. No. 2, P.86, Ln.22-24, Johnson)
22. He promised I would be hired to sell the
23. lots. He promised me that three or four times when he
24. realized what I had done for him.
The respondents deceived Johnson and everyone else by pretending they were
partners. McPhee deceived Johnson into believing he would be paid, that he could trust "us",
meaning JCAV. McPhee also deceived Johnson into believing he would be selling the lots once
. they were built. Johnson waited patiently as McPhee made the part payments. He was desperate
and in agony. He relied on JCA V's financial backing and McPhee's promises. It would be
unwise for Johnson to sue if he was going to make a lot of money by earning it, by selling the
lots and getting a commission on the land sale. Furthermore, Johnson was mentally crippled and
desperate beyond description for money, immediately, not someday after who knows how long a
lawsuit might take.
The grounds for equitable estoppel against the respondents' assertion of the statute of limitations
are clearly in evidence. At the very least, there are unresolved issues of material fact, which
would determine the outcome of the case, i.e. whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies.
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The court erred by time barring the conduct as a matter of law without a trial.
Statue of Limitations/ Continuing Tort
The Court ruled (Transcript P.63 Ln.3-14) " ... there is a significant timeframe distinction
between those incidents that primarily consist the cause of action for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, which primarily generally include those periods
back in 2003. The simple fact that there continued to a perhaps resurfacing of some
animosities between these two gentlemen in 2005 or 2006 is not - in the estimation of
this Court, even granting the inferences that Mr. Johnson is entitled to, would establish
the presence of a continuing tort."
The Court has utterly mischaracterized Johnson's case and all the evidence. There is no
evidence that there were "animosities" between these two gentlemen in 2003. There is evidence
that McPhee brutally abused and dominated Johnson and psychologically slaughtered him, at the
same time as being his best friend and doing fabulous business together. Johnson just took it like
a deer in the headlights, he tried to have a thick skin.
(JCAV Tr.2, P93, Johnson)
8. I was in complete denial that it could
9. possibly happen, that it was actually happening. I was
10. just frigging paralyzed

Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749, 123 Idaho 598, appeal after remand 869 P.2d 229, 125
Idaho 229 (1993) By its very nature, tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
will often involve series of acts over period of time, rather than one single act causing
severe emotional distress; for that reason, concept of continuing tort should be
extended to apply to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
The time frame differential is between the primary acts comprising the claim, there is no actual
break in abusive conduct or in the abusive nature of the relationship.
(JCAV Tr.2, P.94-95, Johnson)
19. It was a water torture type abuse the whole
20. time. I don't want to say there was no abuse. But it
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21. was an actionable type of abuse. It was just basically
22. a situat.ion where Mike was amused that I was so, like
23. you say, weak or that I was traumatized. He found it
24. amusing.
25. Q. Did he tell you that?
I. He snickered all the time.
2. Q. Was he snickering at you?
3. Yes.
(JCAV Tr.2, P.57, Johnson)
2. Q. Let me ask you this. Did Mike touch you in
3. 2005?
4. A. He - in a light way that was sickening to
5. me, he did, yes.
6. Q. When did that happen? Name a date and a
7. place and a time.
8. A. It was in his office. And I was sitting
9. there. And he walked past me behind me and rubbed his
JO. hand across the back ofmy shoulders.
11. Q. And what day was that?
12. A. In a gentle kind of petting kind of way.
13. Q. What day was that?
14. A. I don't recall.
15. Q. What time was it?
16. A. It was a time when I was working with the 17. it might have been 2004. But it was in his office.
18. And I don't allege that necessarily as a factor in this
19. lawsuit. He's just a very creepy person.
The continuing tort theory applied to intentional infliction of emotional distress, recognizes that
emotionally abusive relationships sometimes endure, and that the nature of the abuse may vary
over time. Johnson was extremely weak from the time McPhee told him to bend over, and it
didn't take much after that for McPhee to reassert his domination, even a little snicker at the
mentally crippled socially ostracized Johnson was viscous.
Once McPhee stopped making part payments and Johnson appealed to JCAV, McPhee's cruelty,
hatred, vulgarity and domination became torrential, like it was during the dispute over non-
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refundable earnest money on 6600 Government Way.
(McPhee Tr.2 P.92, Johnson)
9. Q. All Right. And so tell me exactly what
10. Mr. McPhee said during any of these telephone
11. conversations that was taunting.
12. A. You deranged motherfucker; no one will
13. believe you; you're crazy; you're a fly on my ass; we
14. don't have to pay you.
(JCAV Tr.2 P.108, Johnson)
13. Q. Tell me what was said.
14. A. What was said was, by me, Mike you have a
15. blind spot; you promised to pay me; there's no other
16. realtor that would have put - I did so much for you
17. and you just think I'm nothing, and you're wrong and
18. I'm going to try to explain to you that I'm frigging
19. very, very, very smart, and you just don't get it.
20. And he said, fuck you, you're a fly on my
21. ass; you'rea piece of shit; blip blip blah blah ...
22. As bad as you can treat somebody.
This is not a "resurfacing of animosities" as the Court inferred, it is a continuation of a brutally
abusive domination and psychological slaughter.
Respondent's exhibit #7 is a voice mail McPhee left for Johnson after Johnson appealed to
JCAV for payment, and says approximately, "Hey you fucking dickhead, why don't you call me
back? I need to borrow some money, you never loaned me a nickel. You fucking prick. Give
me a call." Only an abusive sociopath would expect a call baGk after leaving such a message. It
is clear from that message, considering all the other evidence, that McPhee's role in the
relationship was as a dominating abuser, who used power over money to taunt and who was
obsessed with genitalia.
McPhee Interrogatory No. 214: Did you leave me a voice mail, saying "Hey you fucking
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dickhead ... call me"? McPhee's Answer: NO
McPhee is clearly not forthcoming in his testimony or his answers. The Court erred and was
biased by construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the moving party, inferring
"resurfacing of animosities". There was a continuously abusive domination from the day
McPhee first said "Suck my dick" to the day he said "You're a fly on my ass." The continuing
tort theory should apply.

Johnson v. Pischke, 700 P.2d 19, 108 Idaho 397 (1985) Policy behind statue of
limitations is protection of defendants against stale claims, and protection of courts
against needless expenditures of resources.
Clearly this is not a stale claim. Johnson filed as soon as he was able, after exhausting all other
potential remedies, and after it became apparent that JCAV would not investigate or intervene.
Statue of Limitations / Disability

Johnson also argued he was disabled and that therefor the running time should have
been suspended. (LC. 5-230)
Extreme and Outrageous

The Court ruled (Transcript P.65 Ln.19-21) " .. .I have to come to the conclusion for the
purposes of summary judgment that these statements were extreme and outrageous."
But then stated:
(Transcript P.67 Ln.16-25, P.68 Ln.1-4) "However, the Court is not prepared to
conclude that those actions that he's alleged against Mr. McPhee were so extreme or
outrageous that they would meet the criteria for the second element of a cause of action.
Since the Court will be the finder of fact, it certainly is possible to infer that Mr. McPhee
could not reasonably be regarded his conduct is so extreme and outrageous such as to
permit a recovery for emotional distress. Instead 1 think these actions fall within the
category of, rough around the edges, inconsiderate, or hurtful, but certainly not the
outrageous conduct that would be required to support such a cause of action."
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For purposes of summary judgment in a Court trial, the Court may make reasonable inferences
upon undisputed facts. The Court said, "it is POSSIBLE to infer," but the standard is reasonable.
McPhee testified under oath that Johnson's allegations were a complete fabrication.
If the Court assumes that Johnson's allegations were true, it must also assume that McPhee lied
about them under oath, and ask why. IfMcPhee's conduct was just ordinary locker room talk, or
rough around the edges, or unkind, and Johnson was such a weakling that it crippled him, then
why didn't McPhee testify to that? It is unreasoi1able to believe, that under advice of an
attorney, McPhee would deny under oath engaging in ordinary locker room talk or being
"inconsiderate" with Johnson, ifhe had indeed been so. The reasonable and most probable
inference, assuming the truth of Johnson's allegations, is that McPhee was deeply ashamed of
what he'd done, knew it was horrible, knew he had to lie about it, and therefore did lie about it
under oath.For purposes of summary judgment, construing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party, assuming that McPhee's conduct caused Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder in Johnson, which is an extremely serious debilitating condition caused by exposure to
horrific events images or threats, assuming that McPhee's conduct caused the bizarre abdominal
pinching evident in the Look Your Heart in the Mirror video (Appellant's Exhibit 9), and
assuming McPhee's conduct caused Johnson to faint and pass a massive bowel movement as per
the affidavit of Cheryl Burchell (Jan. 5, 2007), it is extremely unreasonable to infer that
McPhee's conduct was just rough around the edges or inconsiderate. The Court erred by making
unreasonable improbable inferences, by construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
moving party, and was biased.
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Further the Court stated: (Transcript P.66 Ln.6-18) But, certainly, for this Court to come
to the conclusion that this would support an action for intentional infliction or negligent
infliction of mental distress or emotional distress would leave the Court to pretty much
open the door to any type of locker room comments or vulgar discussions between
people. I mean, you could have a cause of action against my drill instructor for.the kind
of language that Mr. Johnson has complained about here. While certainly it is not pretty
language or comfortable language, I don't think it rises to the level of outrageousness that
the statute requires under our law."
Johnson's case was based on violent and shocking demonically evil repeated invasions of
Johnson's mind; heinous and cruel, use and abuse, domination in business; and heart rending
torment, threatening to screw a woman Johnson loved and charming her away form him. All of
this caused massive bodily disturbances and severe crippling mental illness, chaos in Johnson's
life, in his family, and in society. It would be unconscionable to deny justice to Johnson on the
grounds that it would make vulgar language actionable. Clearly all the requirements for a claim
of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress have been met. No judge or jury is
stupid enough to award damages for vulgar language.

Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson, July 31, 2006: Mike McPhee told me, approximately in
the spring of 2003, while I was in the front seat of his car, "suck my dick." This was
after he had charmed my girlfriend and established a domination in our friendship and
business relationship. He said it in a way that was not specious or raucous. He meant
it. He leaned back in his seat and mildly projected his crotch. I was shocked and
terrified, and unable to react appropriately. I rationalized my frozen panic with a moral
and philosophical stance of acceptance. For about the next month, each time Mike
McPhee (hereinafter McPhee) and I were alone, McPhee made some sick beckoning
gesture to torture me. He would lick his lips, avert my eyes to his crotch, and make
slurping sounds. I became more and more frozen. We were in a remote area of the
Highlands Golf Course, I was driving the golf cart. I had to urinate and went into the
trees. When I got back he told me to whip it out. I was in denial, paralyzed in silent
panic. I drove the cart. He told me then, directly in a penetrating tone of voice, "Bend
over, I'll drive." The image from McPhee's phallic description combined with the depth
and strength ofMcPhee's voice caused me psychologically to experience being
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forcefully sodomized. This was the death ofme. My only thought was: Mike, you
murdered me ...
Having failed at everything I tried, having lost my girlfriend, having terrible
physiological
and psychological symptoms of PTSD, I lost all bearing in life. Everywhere I went,
people leered at me, whispered to each other abont me. Waitresses would leave me
sitting without waiting on me. I was a villain in everyone's eyes, and somehow I
became one in my own eyes, blaming and hating myself for all my failures, craziness,
etc. I became terribly irritable around my kids, I got evicted from my home, thrown out
of a coffee shop, a dance club, and was at the brink of death from anxiety, really.
McPhee is extraordinarily powerfully intelligent and perceptive, and capable of influencing
people to believe in him and trust him and give him carte blanche, but McPhee occasionally
channels that power in deeply diabolical ways, sociopathic ways, murderously. The severity of
Johnson's psychiatric injuries cannot be overstated, nor can the maligning or agony he has
endured.
Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson, July 31, 2006: Kieth, who McPhee befriended after he
destroyed me, died of psychological related causes about 6 months after he had a falling
out with McPhee.
JCA V Liability for McPhee's Conduct
The Court ruled (Transcript P.68, Ln. 8-17) " ... those things that Mr. Johnson complains
about are all attributable to Mr. McPhee and certainly is not actionable against JCA V
(SIC) on that basis."
Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 118 Idaho 297 (1990):
Principal is liable for to1ts of agent committed within the scope of agency relationship
Johnson has alleged in his Complaint and testified to hostile aggravation, tormenting, and
undue influence, all of which occurred within the scope of the agency relationship between
McPhee and JCAV.
Hatrock v Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, C.A. 9 Idaho (1984)
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Under Idaho common law, principle may be liable for punitive damages for acts of its
agent upon clear showing that agent had managerial status or that principal ordered or
ratified acts in question.
Rhein v. ADT Automotive, Inc., 122 N.M. 646,930 P.2d 783, 1996 - NMSC - 066
(1996) Principal may be held liable for punitive damages when principal has in some way
authorized, ratified or participated in wanton, oppressive, malicious, fraudulent or
criminal acts of its agent.
Foley Co. v. Scottsdale Ins Co. 28 Kan App. 2d 219, 15 P.3d 353 (2000)
A principal who receives notice of an unauthorized act of an agent must promptly
repudiate the agent's actions or it is presumed that the principal ratified the act.
Jessen v .. National Excess Ins. Co. 108 N.M. 625, 776 P.2d 1244 (1989)
Ratification of another's act requires either knowledge of material facts or
circumstances sufficient to put reasonable person on notice to inquire into those facts;
ratification may be implied by acquiescence in results of unauthorized act, or by
retention of benefits of that act.
Tri-Circle, Inc. v Brugger Corp., 829 P.2d 540, 121 Idaho 950 (Idaho App. 1992)
Express authority may be found when there is evidence that principal has explicitly
granted agent authority to act in principal's name.
Johnson has testified that he informed JCA V of the wanton conduct, and JCAV admittedly did
nothing. (See JCA V answers to Interrogatories under Negligence below) JCA V is therefore
liable for punitive damages for the acts of McPhee, even those not done within the scope of his
agency.

Breach of Contract

The Court ruled: (Transcript P.72 L.18) "However, in this particular case we are dealing
with a specific real estate statute, and that specific real estate statute requires a writing."
Assuming the Court is referring here to LC. 54-2084, which states that any agency relationship
in a regulated real estate transaction must be in writing, the Court erred, because there need not
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be an agency representation agreement for there to be a compensation agreement. Furthermore,
the compensation agreement need not be in writing if there is part payment. LC. 9-504 (Part
Payment exception to Statute of Frauds). The published legal opinion of the Idaho Real Estate
Commission states that a real estate agent has legal standing to pursue his or her contract rights
to compensation, absent a signed representation agreement, due to the perfectly legal relationship
status known as nonagent.

REAL ESTATE COMMISSION Guideline # 20 states in its conclusion regarding
non-agency "representation":
Idaho Real Estate License Law and Rules does not require a licensee to
form an agency relationship with either buyer or seller of property in order
to engage in the business of real estate.
A "nonagent" licensee can receive a compensation in accordance with his
or her contract rights with a buyer, seller or another licensee for work
performed in the business of real estate.
Assuming the Court is referring I.C. 9-508, as the specific real estate statute, which the Court did
not mention, but which the respondents cited;
"The primary purpose of LC. 9-508 is to prevent fraudulent or unfounded claims of
brokers. This particular portion of our code relates entirely to statutes of frauds and has
as its objective avoiding disputes as to whether or not an agreement in fact exists, the
amount of a commission and the exclusive or non-exclusive terms of a listing
agreement." C. Forsman Real Estate Co., v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511,515,547 P.2d 1116
1120 (1976)
Johnson alleged that McPhee refused to sign a contract, and used undue influence to force
Johnson to accept payment directly, not through a broker. Johnson alleged and testified that
McPhee made part payment of the oral contract, thereby exempting it from the statute of frauds
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to the Thayer Addendum, McPhee was a managing member of JCA V and did in fact buy the
land. Secondly, to argue that McPhee was not an agent of JCAV is absurd. Johnson submitted
into evidence (Appellant's Exhibit I) numerous real estate contracts which McPhee negotiated
and signed on behalf of JCAV using Johnson as his real estate agent. JCAV ratified all those
contracts by fulfilling them. JCAV testified that McPhee was authorized to send threatening
letters to Johnson on behalf of JCAV through JCAV's attorney Steve McCrae, and that McPhee
was authorized to sign a listing agreement on behalf of JCAV.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Was Mike Mcphee acting on behalf of JCAV, LLC when
he signed a listing agreement with Jay Johnson and GMAC Real Estate for the sale of
6600 Government Way?
JCAV ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY #6: It was authorized because I was out of
the area and not available.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Was Mike McPhee acting on behalf of JCAV, LLC, when
he sent letters to Jay Johnson of GMAC Real Estate through attorney Stephen McCrae,
demanding release of Bill Peterson's earnest money?
JCAV ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY #6: Yes he was authorized.
Stout v. McNary, 75 Idaho 99,267 p.2d 655 (1954); "Relationship of principal and
agent, when shown to exist, will be presumed to continue in absence of anything to
show its termination."
Caballero v. Wikse, 92 P.3d 1076, 140 Idaho 329 (2004)
Even in the absence of actual authority, and agent may bind principal if the agent is
cloaked with apparent authority.
The respondents' arguments and pleadings denying an agency relationship between McPhee and
JCA V are absurd, and the court erred and revealed extreme,bias by ruling perfectly consistent
with those arguments. The oral contract McPhee made with Johnson is enforceable due to the
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part payment exception to the statnte of frauds, and due to unconscionability of not enforcing it.

Negligence against JCA V

The court ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship between
Mike McPhee and JCAV, (Transcript P.69, L.2-8) and that there was nothing to indicate that
JCAV had, in fact, approved or acknowledged any of the conduct that is attributable to Mr.
McPhee. (Transcript P.69, Ln.14-17) and that the lack of any established agency evidence bars
the Court's ability to conclude that there's.a material issue of fact with respect to Negligence.
Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson, July 31, 2006: I appealed to Jack Vanderwaal. I sent
him a text message, saying I wanted to talk to him, confidential. I called him about four
hours later .... I told him I hadn't been paid sufficiently, that McPhee had been very
cruel, and I couldn't talk to McPhee any more ...
Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson, July 31, 2006: I told Jack that McPhee had left abusive
messages. I told Jack that McPhee had asked me to perform oral sex, and I imitated
one of the slurping noises McPhee had made.
INTERROGATORY NO. 41: Did the managing director make any effort whatsoever to
investigate whether Mike McPhee might have abused Jay Johnson to an extent and in
a nature that was serious?
JCAV ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 41: No, this was none ofmy business.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Was the managing director informed by Jay Johnson that
Mike McPhee had been extremely angry in the past and that Jay Johnson could not
cope with talking to or negotiating with Mike McPhee?
JCAV ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO 21: No, the managing director was not
concerned about any personal problems between Mike McPhee and Jay Johnson.
Email to Jack Vanderwaal from Jay Johnson dated August 26, 2005): (Appellant's
Exhibit #8) "Roughly six months ago, I called Mike and asked that he sign a contract to
pay commission on the land sale. He said, "we are not going to do that." When we
talked about his paying me directly, not through a broker, he said I should keep it quiet,
since he knew I am not allowed to earn commission income without the involvement of a
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broker. This grieved me, but Mike had been so furious and unruly over disagreements in
the past,
that I went along with it, trusting things would work out."
West v Souke, 968 P.2d 228, 132 Idaho 133, rehearing denied 0998)
Cause of action for negligence includes proof of(!) a duty, recognized by law, requiring
the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct (2) a breach of duty (3) a causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries (4) actua_l loss or
damage.
(I) McPhee was JCAV's agent and JCAV owed a duty to Johnson to investigate his
allegations of wanton behavior and breach of contract by McPhee. (2) Clearly JCAV breached
that duty (3) Johnson testified that he informed JCAV that he was near death and poverty
stricken. (Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson regarding text messages, August 29,2006 #16) By
not investigating the claims, by not making good on his agent's oral contract, JCAV's wanton
negligence left Johnson helpless, in agony, broke, disabled and forced Johnson to
endure more excruciating abuse from McPhee, if he wanted to get paid; all of which heightened
his psychiatric distress to an immeasurable extreme. (4) the actual damages are primarily
psychiatric agony, but also loss of credibility with creditors, loss of stability in living situation,
and loss of income.
See above under JCAV Liablity for McPhee's conduct regarding JCA V "approving or
acknowledging conduct". Clearly there is a valid claim for Negligence against JCA V.

Perjury
The respondents committed prima facie felony perjury before a Notary Public of the State of
Idaho, by affirming before the same notary on the same day that they were both managing
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members of JCAV, LLC. (Appellant's Exhibit 5)
Idaho Code 18-5401: Every person who, having taken an oath that he will testify,
declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative
committee, officer, or person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by
law be administered, willfully and contrary to such oath, states as true and
material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.
Affidavit of Jack Vanderwaal, April 12, 2006: Niether JCAV, LLC or myself have had
any oral agreement with Mike McPhee for the purchase of property or for the
development of property ... Mike McPhee is not now, and has never been, a member of
JCAV, LLC.
It is not a matter of the record, but will not be disputed, that the Notary Public, Janae Gravelle,
who affirmed that she had knowledge that McPhee was a managing member of JCA V, and
Charles Lempsis, the attorney that prepared the document with the signature lines, were both
directly involved with the Radiant Lake Estates project. Janae Gravelle was an executive
secretary to Tom Johnson of Neighborhood, Inc. and Charles Lempsis was the attorney hired to
advocate the subdivision at municipal hearings. These people were very helpful to McPhee and
JCAV, and the fact that McPhee and JCA V would lie bold faced to them, under penalty of .
perjury, reveals many of the main aspects of Johnson's claim. Only a criminal or sociopath,
purchasing a property for a community subdivison, would lie under penalty of perjury in doing
so. Only a negligent dupe would allow McPhee to sign on that line. The respondents'
willingness to deceive under penalty of perjury should have been weighed very seriously by the
Court. Instead the Court repeatedly referred deferentially to their testimony in its ruling.

Affidavit of Curtis Jay Johnson, July 31, 2006: I believe that McPhee had a power over
Jack ...
Johnson did not see the Thayer Addendum until it was produced for JCA V's Motion for
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Summary Judgment. Obviously McPhee had a power over Jack. Everyone became McPhee's
fool, if he wanted them to. He relished his ability to deceive and get away with anything.
Bias

Judge Luster was fonnerly a law partner with Steve McCrae, who represents JCA V. Clearly,
Judge Luster has shown bias by finding insufficient evidence of agency between McPhee and
JCAV. His ruling perfectly consistent with each and every one of the respondents' inferences
and arguments, despite the weight and quality of evidence, the. law, and sound reasoning, being
obviously in support of the merit and justness of the appellant's case, clearly reveals that
Johnson has not received due process.

CONCLUSION

Johnson did extraordinary real estate work on behalf of JCA V and Mike McPhee. But
McPhee psycho-sexually tortured and dominated Johnson into the ground and into an abysmal
chaotic hell for a life, from which Johnson has required four years of intense extremely
intellectually and emotionally demanding inner work to recover from. Johnson was socially
maligned and ostracized as a wretched sex offender due to his derangement, but McPhee was the
real sex offender, and a fiend who took great advantage of Johnson's talent and good will toward
him. JCAV was wanton by ignoring Johnson's pleas for payment, and by allowing McPhee to
fraudulently represent himself as a managing member of JCA V.
Johnson alleged and provided significant evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct by
McPhee and agency between McPhee and JCAV. The conduct should clearly not be time barred
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for any and all of the three reasons cited. Johnson alleged and provided significant evidence of
an oral contract and part payment thereof, and demonstrated that the contract is enforceable by
law. It would be unconscionable not to enforce the contract.
JCAV has clearly been negligent and that negligence is actionable by law.
The respondents have committed felony perjury. The respondents' arguments are
baseless, defy common sense, and are often absurd. The summary judgment in favor of the
respondents in complete agreement with their arguments was biased to a degree, which makes
the ruling unconscionable and a miscarriage of justice, and on that ground, and the grounds
stated above, the mling of summary judgment with prejudice in favor of the respondents should
be overturned in its entirety on all causes of action, and the case should be remanded to the
district court and reassigned to another judge for trial.
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